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INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1970's, the American public has experienced
an unprecedented awakening concerning the dangers posed to
the environment by certain practices of American industry.' One
aspect of this new awareness has been the recognition of the formidable costs required to repair damage already inflicted upon
2
the environment.
A Congressional response to these environmental concerns
was the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 3 CERCLA was enacted in
1. Patricia L. Quentel, The Liability of Financial Institutionsfor Hazardous Waste
Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139, 139-4 1.

2. Id. at 140 n.3.
3. CERCLA §§ 101-175, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).

(89)
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order to establish a mechanism to respond to problems and costs
associated with abandoned and inactive waste disposal sites. 4
Generally, CERCLA authorizes the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to identify hazardous waste sites and provides EPA
with the funding required to clean up those sites. 5 CERCLA also
allows EPA to compel those parties who are determined to be responsible for the release 6 of the hazardous waste materials 7 to re8
imburse the government for the costs involved in the cleanup.
One provision in CERCLA has been the source of much discussion and controversy concerning the scope of the statute's
reach in attempting to spread the costs of environmental cleanups. 9 This provision, popularly labeled the security interest exemption,' 0 exempts from liability lenders who hold a security
interest in property identified as a hazardous waste site, and who
meet the requirements of the provision. " In recent years, inconsistent court decisions interpreting the security interest exemption have created uncertainty among lenders.' 2 Accordingly,
lenders are concerned that they may be held liable for the activities of their debtors.' 3 Facing this troubling possibility, lenders
perceive the need for some clarification of the activities that might
lead to liability under CERCLA, in order to restore their confi14
dence in the protection that the exemption offers.
EPA responded to the lenders' demand for guidance in April
4. H.R. REP. No. 1016 (Part I & II), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125.
5. See Quentel, supra note 1, at 142.
6. CERCLA defines "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous
substance . . .)." CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
7. The term "hazardous waste" is defined by CERCLA according to designations in various other environmental statutes and includes several exclusions.
CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). For purposes of this Comment, the
term "hazardous waste" will be used interchangeably with the terms "hazardous
substances" and "hazardous waste materials."
8. CERCLA §§ 104, 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607.
9. See, e.g., Paul A. Dominick & Leon C. Harmon, Lender Limbo: The Perils of
Environmental Lender Liability, 41 S.C. L. REV. 855, 856 (1990).
10. See, e.g., Clyde Mitchell, The EPA Proposed Rule and Lender Liability Under
CERCLA, 206 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1991).
11. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
12. Neal B. Glick & Kevin L. Nulton, Lender Liability Under the Superfund Statute, MASS. LAw. WKLY., July 22, 1991, at 37.
13. See, e.g., Charles F. Lettow, Five Questions May Hold Key to Ultimate
Superfund Liability, BANKING POL'Y REP., May 20, 1991.
14. Id.
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1992 by issuing final regulations designed to ease the concerns of
lenders and other interested parties by specifying the scope of a
lender's responsibility under CERLCA.' 5 In addition, legislation
has been proposed in recent sessions of Congress that would address the liability of lenders for CERCLA cleanup costs.' 6 This
governmental activity has fueled the debate regarding the wisdom
of the security interest exemption. 17 Lenders assert that they are
merely innocent parties who require regulatory and/or statutory
protection from CERCLA liability.' Environmental groups, on
the other hand, claim that expansion of the security interest exemption is unnecessary and in contravention of the intent behind
CERCLA's liability scheme.19
This Comment will explore the controversy surrounding the
security interest exemption under CERLCA. The analysis will begin with a description of CERCLA in general and the security interest exemption in particular. Next, an examination of the
leading cases that have dealt with the security interest exemption
will provide the background for the claims that this area is in need
of clarification. This Comment will then consider the possible responses to lender liability by explaining the final EPA regulations,
the legislative proposals, and actions that lenders may take on
their own to protect themselves. Finally, the Comment will examine the contrasting positions of lenders and environmental
groups concerning the proper interpretation of the security interest exemption.
II.
A.

A HISTORY OF LENDER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA

The History of CERCLA

CERCLA was enacted as a response to the discovery of several hazardous waste sites in the late 1970's.20 In the rush to pass
15. Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). For a description of the final EPA regulations, see
infra notes 166-216 and accompanying text.
16. For a description of the proposed legislation, see infra notes 240-54 and
accompanying text.
17. Proposed Lender Liability Rule Removes Cleanup Incentives, Some Commenters
Say, [hereinafter Commenters], Banking Daily (BNA) (Sept. 4, 1991).
18. Id. For a further discussion of the arguments lenders have made in support of a broad interpretation of the security interest exemption, see infra notes
226-39 and accompanying text.
19. Commenters, supra note 17. For further discussion of the arguments supporting a narrow construction of the security interest exemption, see infra notes
217-25 and accompanying text.
20. 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119-23. The attention of the public and Congress
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legislation to address this serious problem, Congress drafted in
CERCLA a statute that was full of compromises and that has been
described as being "marred by vague terminology and deleted
provisions." 2 ' In addition, the lack of a clear legislative history
has made interpretation of CERCLA's broadly drafted provisions
22
a difficult task for courts.
CERCLA was amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). 23 Generally, SARA established more stringent hazardous waste cleanup standards, and
broadened EPA's powers with respect to the investigation of and
24
access to hazardous waste sites.
B.

How CERCLA Works

CERCLA provides the federal government2 5 with the power
to identify hazardous waste sites for which cleanup measures are
necessary. 26 Once EPA determines that a facility 2 7 has released

or threatens release of a hazardous substance, the agency is au28
thorized by CERCLA to undertake an appropriate response.
2
9
EPA may target the parties that it deems responsible for the release and may give these parties the opportunity to clean up the
30
facility themselves.
Alternatively, EPA may decide to take action on its own, parwas focused on the potential environmental hazards by incidents at places such
as Love Canal in New York and the Valley of the Drums, in Kentucky. Id.
21. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 838-39 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 810 F.2d
726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
22. Douglas M. Garrou, The Potentially Responsible Trustee: Probable Target for
CERCLA Liability, 77 VA. L. REV. 113, 119 (1991).
23. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1988)).

24. Quentel, supra note 1, at 142 n.12.
25. In Exec. Order No. 12,316, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1982), the primary responsibility for enforcing the CERCLA provisions was delegated to EPA.
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 576 (D. Md.
1986).
26. CERCLA § 103(d)(1)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(d)(1)(A)-(B) (1988).
27. The term "facility" as defined by CERCLA is so broad that it can include practically anything. Watercraft and consumer products in consumer use
are specifically excepted. CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
28. CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). CERCLA empowers EPA to
take any actions that will "prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public
health or welfare or to the environment .... Id. EPA may physically remove
hazardous substances and may evaluate the nature and extent of the release. Id.
29. See infra notes 37-39 and related text for a discussion of responsible
parties under CERCLA.
30. See CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604.
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ticularly if it decides that the situation presents the potential to
endanger health. 3' The action of EPA may take the form of an
order to one or more of the targeted responsible parties, requiring a cleanup of the site. 32 EPA may also have the contaminated
site cleaned up through the use of government funds. 3 3 CERCLA
established the Hazard Response Trust Fund, more commonly
3 4 If
referred to as "Superfund," to pay for such cleanups.
Superfund dollars are used, EPA can take legal action against
those parties identified to be responsible3 5 under CERCLA for
reimbursement of the actual expenses required to clean up the
6
site.3
C.

The Liability Scheme of CERCLA

CERCLA identifies four groups of "potentially responsible
37
parties" (PRP's) from whom EPA may seek cleanup costs.
These groups of PRP's include: (1) current owners or operators
38
of facilities containing hazardous waste sites; (2) any person
who owned or operated a facility at the time hazardous waste was
disposed of; (3) any person who by contract or other agreement
arranged for the disposal or transport of hazardous waste from a
facility owned by another party; and (4) any person who accepts
any hazardous substances for transport to disposal facilities selected by that person, from which there is a release of hazardous
39
substances.
Each of the four categories of PRP's have been held to be
31. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
32. CERCLA § 106(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)-(b). In addition to requiring the cleanup of the site, these provisions authorize EPA to impose fines of up
to $25,000 per day for lack of compliance. Id.
33. CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
34. Id. Congress had initially authorized $2.2 billion to provide for the
funding of CERCLA cleanups. CERCLA § 131(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9631(b)(2)
(1980) (repealed 1986). In 1986, Congress increased the amount of the funding
to $8.5 billion. CERCLA § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1988).
35. CERCLA § 104(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(1).
36. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). In addition, offenders who did
not comply with an original EPA order to clean up the site are subject to being
charged triple the amount EPA incurred in the actual cleanup of the facility.
CERCLA § 107(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3).
37. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
38. A "person" is defined by CERCLA to mean "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity,
United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(21).
39. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
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strictly liable under CERCLA. 40 In addition, all parties determined to be responsible under CERCLA are subject to joint and
several liability. 4' This means that lenders may be liable for all or
a part of the cost of a cleanup of a hazardous waste site, even
though some other party was directly responsible for the release
of the hazardous waste. 42 Lenders may be particularly vulnerable
under the joint and several liability standard, since they are con' 43
sidered to have "deep pockets."

D.

Liability of Lenders Under CERCLA

The basis of a lender's liability under CERCLA has been
whether the lender can be determined by its actions to be or to
44
have been an owner or operator of a hazardous waste facility.

CERCLA, in defining the term "owner or operator," provides
lenders with potential relief from liability. 4 5 An owner or opera40. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989); Tanglewood East Homeowners v.
Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th Cir. 1988). CERCLA states
that "liability" is subject to the same standard that controlled under the earlier
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1321
(1970). Courts had held that this standard was strict liability. See New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
41. See, e.g., Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 171. While CERCLA does not require joint and several liability, it allows such liability in the event of indivisible
harm. Id.
42. See Quentel, supra note 1, at 155.
43. See Lettow, supra note 13. Lenders may also be the only PRP with the
ability to pay the cleanup costs, since their direct involvement in the facility in
the first place is often due to borrowers who are experiencing financial difficulties. See Quentel, supra note 1, at 179.
44. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). See Dominick & Harmon, supra
note 9, at 857.
45. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). It should be noted
that, in addition to the security interest exemption, CERCLA does provide for
certain narrow affirmative defenses that are available to all PRP's. CERCLA
§ 107(b)(1)-(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(1)-(3). CERCLA states that there will be
no liability for a person who would otherwise be liable if that person can show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the release of a hazardous substance was
due to: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; or (3) an act of an unrelated third
party. Id.
Although the "third party" defense would appear to hold the most hope for
a lender seeking exclusion from liability, this defense has generally been interpreted narrowly by the courts and does not provide dependable protection for
lenders. Quentel, supra note 1, at 156-58. In order to be able to successfully
assert the third party defense, a PRP must demonstrate that: (1) the release of a
hazardous substance was caused solely by the act or omission of a third party; (2)
the release did not occur in connection with a contractual relationship with the
PRP; and (3) the PRP exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
SARA slightly broadened this defense by defining "contractual relationship" to exclude situations in which the real property involved was acquired
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tor under CERCLA "does not include a person, who, without participating in the management of a . . . facility, holds indicia of

ownership primarily to protect his security interest 4 6 in the ...
47
facility."
Although this exemption seems straightforward, the interpretation of its terms has posed problems for courts trying to determine whether a lender should be considered an operator or
owner. 48 The holdings of these courts have left unclear the circumstances under which a lender will be considered to have lost
the benefit of the exemption as a result of participation in the
management of a debtor's business. 4 9 For instance, questions
may arise as to whether a lender which provides assistance on financial matters, or negotiates a loan workout with a struggling
borrower, is participating in management or simply protecting its
50
security interest.
A second question relevant to the interpretation of the securafter disposal of the hazardous waste. CERCLA § 101(35)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(35)(A). However, in order to take advantage of this "innocent landowner" aspect of the third party defense, a PRP must prove that at the time it
acquired the facility, it did not know and had no reason to know of the presence
of the hazardous substance. CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 9601

(35)(A)(i).
Since the focus of this Comment is the security interest exemption available
to lenders, a more extensive description of the affirmative defenses under CERCIA is beyond its scope. For a more detailed discussion, see Daniel M. Steinway, The Innocent Landowner Defense: An Emerging Doctrine, 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA)
486 (Sept. 27, 1989).
46. A security interest generally arises when a lender, wishing to protect
itself and to minimize the risk that the loan will not be repaid, requires the borrower to secure the loan with some form of collateral. If the borrower should
default on the loan, the lender has the option of foreclosing on the collateral.
Quentel, supra note 1, at 160.
47. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). This provision describes the term "owner or operator" as follows:
(i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering
by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in
the case of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to
bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar
means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned,
operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately
beforehand.
Id.
48. Quentel, supra note 1, at 160-61.
49. Cases that have considered this issue include In re Bergsoe Metal
Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901
F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). For a further
discussion of Bergsoe, see infra notes 121-29 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Fleet Factors, see infra notes 90-120 and accompanying text.
50. See cases cited supra note 49.
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ity interest exemption involves the point at which a lender should
be considered an owner under CERCLA. 5 1 For example, it is not
clear whether a lender which forecloses on the property of a defaulting borrower is, as a result, no longer eligible for the protec52
tion provided by the security interest.
E.

Treatment of the Security Interest Exemption by the
Courts
1.

"Participatingin the Management" of a Facility
a.

Initial interpretationsby lower federal courts

The issue as to whether a lender's security interest may result in the lender being considered an operator under CERCLA
was first addressed by a bankruptcy court in Ohio, in In re T.P.
Long Chemical, Inc. 5 3 In this case, BancOhio National Bank
(BancOhio) held a security interest in the property of T.P. Long
Chemical, Inc., which ran a rubber recycling plant on the prop54
erty in question.
In 1981, after the T.P. Long company filed for bankruptcy,
EPA discovered drums containing hazardous waste buried at the
facility. 55 EPA performed the cleanup of the facility and then
sued BancOhio and the bankrupt debtor's estate for reimburse56
ment of the costs incurred in the cleanup.
Although deciding the case on other grounds,5 7 the court
51. For cases that have addressed the issue of lender as owner, see United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); United
States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,
1985). For a further discussion of Maryland Bank & Trust, see infra notes 136-52
and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Mirabile, see infra notes 6280, 131-35 and accompanying text.
52. See cases cited supra note 51.
53. 45 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
54. Id. at 280. BancOhio held a security interest in the accounts receivable,
equipment, fixtures, inventory, and other personal property of T.P. Long Chemical, as well as the proceeds thereof. Id.
55. Id. at 281. The trustee of the company's estate conducted an auction at
which all of the company's personal property was sold. Id. The company that
bought the personal property caused a release of a hazardous substance at the
Long facility. Id. When the trustee of the company's estate refused EPA's request to clean up the site, EPA cleaned up the facility itself and subsequently
found the drums. Id. Apparently the owner of the bankrupt company was the
only person aware of the buried drums prior to their discovery by EPA. Id.
56. Id. at 280. The court found the estate liable to EPA for cleanup costs,
since it determined that the drums containing the hazardous materials fell within
CERCLA's definition of "facility" and that the estate had an ownership interest
in the drums. Id. at 284.
57. The court found that BancOhio had received no direct benefit from the
cleanup by EPA, since the property in which BancOhio had a security interest
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rejected the argument suggested by EPA that BancOhio was liable under CERCLA as an owner or operator. 58 The court held
that the only possible indicia of ownership that could be attributed to BancOhio involved its activities concerning the protection
of its security interest. 5 9 Since there was no indication that
BancOhio had "participated in the management" of T.P. Long's
facility, BancOhio clearly met the security interest exemption
60
contained in the definition of owner or operator in CERCLA.
Thus the court's literal interpretation of the security interest exemption meant that BancOhio had only acted to protect its security interest and therefore was not subject to liability. 61
The next important case concerning the security interest exemption under CERCLA was decided in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, United States v.
Mirabile.6 2 In Mirabile, EPA sued the owners (the Mirabiles) of a
property containing hazardous waste for the costs incurred by
EPA in the course of a cleanup of the property. 63 Three lenders
were joined in the proceedings pursuant to the third party claims
of the property owners. 64 The lenders were the American Bank &
Trust Company (ABT), the Small Business Administration (SBA),
65
and Mellon Bank National Association (Mellon).
was sold prior to the cleanup. Id. at 288. Therefore, the court found no reason
to charge BancOhio as a secured creditor for the cleanup costs. Id. at 287-88.
58. T.P. Long Chem., 45 B.R. at 288. EPA had argued that the obligation of
the bankruptcy trustee to remove the hazardous waste would have extended to
BancOhio if it had sought to sell the property in which it had a security interest.
Id. EPA asserted that this liability could not be avoided by BancOhio's transfer
of the collateral at auction. Id.
59. Id. at 288-89.
60. Id. at 289.
61. See Quentel, supra note 1, at 164.
62. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985). For a
discussion of Mirabile concerning a lender's liability as owner of a facility, see
infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
63. Id. at 20,995.
64. Id.
65. Id. The first lender, ABT, made a loan in 1973 to an owner of the property not involved in the subsequent litigation. Id. at 20,996. The facility involved was a paint manufacturing facility. Id. The loan by ABT was secured, in
part, by a mortgage on the site of the facility. Id.
Three years later, Girard Bank, the predecessor-in-interest of Mellon Bank,
entered into an agreement with a subsequent owner of the facility, Turco, to
provide working capital. Id. The Mellon loan was secured by the inventory and
assets of the company. Id.
In 1979, SBA provided further financing to the company. Id. SBA secured
its loan with a second lien security interest in the company's machinery and
equipment, a second lien on inventory and accounts receivable, a second mortgage on the real estate, and a pledge of the company's stock. Id.
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In 1980, Turco, then owner of the property, filed a petition
for bankruptcy, which was dismissed by the Bankruptcy Court in
1981.66 The dismissal enabled ABT to proceed with foreclosure
of the real property, for which it was the highest bidder at the
sheriff's sale. 6 7 Between the time of the sheriff's sale and the
eventual assignment of the property to the Mirabiles, ABT took
certain actions to protect the property. 68
The court ruled in favor of ABT's motion for summary judgment, holding that ABT brought itself within the security interest
exemption. 6 9 Importantly, the court stated that before a secured
creditor such as ABT would be subject to CERCLA liability, it
"must, at a minimum, participate in the day-to-day operational
aspects of the site." 70 The sort of financial "control" possessed
by ABT was not sufficient in the court's view to subject ABT to
71
liability.
The court also granted the motion for summary judgment
filed by SBA. 72 Again, the court emphasized that SBA had merely
participated in the financial aspects of the operation. 73 Although
SBA's loan agreement with Turco, as required by SBA regulations at the time, indicated that SBA must provide management
assistance to its borrowers, there was no evidence that such assist74
ance was ever provided.
Mellon Bank's motion for summary judgment against the
Mirabiles was denied.7 5 The court felt that there was a genuine
issue of material fact concerning whether Mellon's involvement
with the operational aspects of the business caused it to become
66. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996.
67. Id. ABT, without ever having perfected its title, assigned its bid for the
property to the Mirabiles approximately four months after the sheriff's sale. Id.
68. Id. ABT secured the building against vandalism, inquired as to the cost
of disposal of drums containing hazardous substances, and visited the property
to show it to prospective purchasers. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The critical factor in determining whether a secured creditor had
become so involved in the affairs of a borrower that they would lose the protection of the exemption, according to the court, was participation in "operational,
production, or waste disposal activities." Id. at 20,995..
71. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,996. The court noted that ABT made

no effort to continue operations of the facility, and in fact did not foreclose until
eight months after all operations had ceased. Id.
72. Id. at 20,997.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 20,996. The extent of SBA's involvement appeared to be three
visits to the site during 1981 to monitor liquidation of the assets. Id.
75. Id. at 20,997.
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ineligible for the security interest exemption. 76 There was testimony that the bank had become heavily involved in the day-today operations of Turco, and may have asserted some control
77
over manufacturing, personnel, and supply decisions.
The Mirabile decision was welcome news to lenders in that
the court specifically stated that lender involvement in a debtor's
financial decisions was permissible under the security interest exemption. 78 However, the decision served to warn lenders who
became heavily involved in the day-to-day operations of a bor79
rower that they might be subject to liability under CERCLA.
The court did not, however, define specific guidelines concerning
.the degree of a lender's involvement in a borrower's business
which would be sufficient to subject it to CERCLA liability.8 0
A district court in Pennsylvania addressed lenders' liability in
both the operator and owner context in Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Manufacturing Co.8 l Guidice involved a dispute among PRP's

in which the National Bank of the Commonwealth (the Bank) was
joined as a third party defendant.8 2 The Bank held a security in83
terest in its debtor's treatment plant.

The debtor eventually defaulted on its obligations to the
Bank, after which representatives of the Bank met with officials of
the debtor to tour the facility and to discuss management issues.8 4
76. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,997. The record indicated that one of
the loan officers in charge of this account for Girard Bank had been a member of
an Advisory Board, established by the president of Turco, which was to oversee
the company's operations. Id. at 20,996.
77. Id. at 20,997. The court noted that certain financial activities conducted
by Girard Bank, such as monitoring the company's cash collateral accounts, ensuring that receivables went to the proper account, and establishing a reporting
system between the company and the bank, would not by themselves give rise to
CERCLA liability. Id.
78. Id. at 20,995.
79. Quentel, supra note 1, at 170.
80. Id.
81. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989). For a discussion of the court's reasoning in Guidice concerning a lender's liability as an owner of a facility, see infra
notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
82. Id. at 557. The original claim was filed by residents of the Borough of
Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania, asserting that BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing Company (BFG) caused environmental contamination on BFG's property
resulting in personal injuries and response costs under CERCLA. Id. BFG filed
a third party complaint against current and previous owners of adjacent property, which included the Bank. Id.
83. Id. at 558.
84. Id. The meeting included discussions of the number of work shifts, the
status of the debtor's accounts, the presence of raw materials, and the composition of the management itself. Id. The management also accepted the Bank's
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The Bank thereafter foreclosed on the mortgage it held on the
86
site8 5 and purchased the facility at the subsequent sheriff's sale.
Soon after the Bank's purchase, the state environmental agency
discovered hazardous wastes in drums of leftover materials from
87
the debtor's operations.
The court reviewed the issue of whether the Bank was liable
as an owner or operator under CERCLA by considering separately the Bank's liability before and after its purchase of the
debtor's property at the sheriff's sale.8 8 For the period prior to
foreclosure, the court followed the reasoning of the Mirabile decision, holding that there would be no liability under CERCLA
since the Bank was merely assisting in the debtor's financial
matters.8 9
b.

Conflicting circuit court decisions

A decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 9 0 seemed to
cast a new light on the types of lender activities that could void
the security interest exemption. Lenders were for the first time
confronted with the real possibility of being liable under CERCLA due to involvement with a debtor's management. 9'
In Fleet Factors, the secured creditor exemption reached the
federal court of appeals level for the first time. 9 2 In this case, the
lender, Fleet Factors Corp. (Fleet), entered into an agreement
with a cloth printing facility in which Fleet agreed to advance
funds against an assignment of the borrower's accounts
93
receivable.
After the borrower filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of
suggestion that the debtor take out a loan guaranteed by the SBA to pay off
amounts owed to the Bank. Id.
85. Id. at 559. The Bank decided to foreclose when the debtor's account
became six months delinquent and after determining that plant operations had
seemingly ceased. Id.
86. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 559. The Bank conveyed the property to a
trustee of the previous owners in January, 1983, with the rents from the facility
being paid directly to the Bank. Id.
87. Id. at 560.
88. Id. at 561-63.
89. Id. at 561-62. The Guidice court noted that the Bank did not control
"operational, production, or waste disposal activities" at the facility. Id. at 562.
90. 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
91. See Glick & Nulton, supra note 12.
92. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1556.
93. Id. at 1552. Fleet also obtained a security interest in the borrower's
textile facility, as well as all of its equipment, inventory and fixtures. Id.
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the Bankruptcy Code in August, 1979, Fleet continued to advance
funds to the borrower until early 1981. 9 4 The bankruptcy court

subsequently permitted Fleet to foreclose on and sell at auction
95
certain inventory and equipment.
In 1984, an inspection by EPA resulted in the discovery of
hazardous substances that were traceable to the operation of
Fleet's borrowers. 96 EPA sued Fleet, among others, for the cost
of the cleanup of the facility, claiming that Fleet was liable under
section 107(a)(2) of CERCLA 97 as an owner or operator of the
facility at the time of the release. 98 The district court denied
Fleet's motion for summary judgment. 99 The court of appeals
then affirmed the district court's decision.' 0 0 In its holding, however, the court of appeals appeared to greatly broaden the test for
determining whether a lender had sufficiently participated in
management to have lost the protection of the security interest
exemption.' 0 '
The court noted that in order to achieve the remedial goals
of CERCLA, ambiguous statutory terms such as "owner" or "operator" should be construed in favor of finding liability, to reim94. Id. Shortly thereafter, the borrower ceased operations, and began to
liquidate its inventory. Id. Meanwhile, Fleet continued to collect on the accounts receivable that had been assigned to it with the approval of the bankruptcy court. Id.
95. Id. at 1552-53. Since Fleet never foreclosed on its security interest in
the facility itself, the district court determined that it could not be held liable as
an owner of the facility. Id. at 1555. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that
under the facts of the case Fleet could not be considered to be the present
owner of the facility. Id. at 1554-55.
96. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1553.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. H 1990).
98. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1555-56.
99. Id. at 1553. The district court's decision to deny Fleet's motion for
summary judgment was based on its holding that a material issue of fact remained concerning whether Fleet had actually contributed to the release of hazardous waste in its attempts to liquidate assets. Id. at 1557. The district court
also found, however, that Fleet's involvement in its debtor's affairs was less than
day-to-day management and therefore did not amount to sufficient participation
in the debtor's activities to void the security interest exemption. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1556-58. The court of appeals actually chose a middle ground
between the government's and Fleet's view of the level of participation in management that was permissible. Id. at 1556. The government argued that a secured creditor that participates in management in any manner should be
excluded from the exemption. Id. The court felt that this interpretation would
"largely eviscerate" the exemption. Id. Fleet argued that the decision by the
Mirabile court, that a lender would only be participating in a borrower's management if it was involved in the borrower's day-to-day operations, should control.
Id. Significantly, the court of appeals felt that this standard was too permissive.
Id. at 1556-58.
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burse the government's expenditures.10 2 The part of the court's
decision which especially alarmed the lending community10 3 was
its indication that a secured creditor may be liable "by participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating
a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous
wastes."' 1 4 The court also stated that although a secured creditor's day-to-day involvement in the facility would "certainly lead
to the loss of the protection of the statutory exemption," the ex10 5
emption could be lost with less than complete involvement.
Although the Eleventh Circuit's comments concerning the
narrow scope of permissible lender involvement could be viewed
as mere "dicta," 1 06 the decision nonetheless created a great deal
of uncertainty and apprehension in the lending community. 0 7
Based on the court's rationale, lenders who merely had the ability
to control a borrower's decisions, even if only through participation in the financial management of the borrower, were potentially subject to liability.' 0 8 Lenders felt that almost any secured
creditor could theoretically be held liable under this construction
of the exclusion. 0 9 This appeared to be a radical expansion of
102. Id. at 1557. The court felt that a primary goal of CERCLA was to force
those parties responsible for environmental damage to pay for cleanup costs
incurred by the government. Id.
103. See Mitchell, supra note 10.
104. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 1557-58. The Eleventh Circuit also said that the exemption
could be lost even if the lender did not participate in management decisions
concerning hazardous waste. The court reiterated that liability could be imposed if the lender's involvement supported the inference that the lender could
affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it chose. Id. at 1558.
It is noteworthy that the particular involvement of Fleet in the borrower's
operations was relatively substantial after the borrower began to wind down its
affairs. Fleet required the borrower to seek Fleet's approval before shipping
goods to customers, established pricing for excess inventory, dictated policy on
shipping and personnel matters, supervised the office administrator's activities
at the site, controlled access to the facility, and arranged for disposal of the borrower's fixtures and equipment. Id. at 1559. While these activities seemed adequate to impose liability on Fleet as an operator of the facility, it was the court's
broad standard of liability and narrow interpretation of the security interest exemption that concerned lenders. Sean P. Madden, Will The CERCLA Be Unbroken? Repairing The Damage After Fleet Factors, 1 FORDHAM L. REV. 135, 148-51
(1990).
106. See Garrou, supra note 22, at 122. The Eleventh Circuit's statements
that a lender could be held liable if it had the capacity to influence a debtor's
hazardous waste treatment were made in a context in which the court found
evidence of actual involvement by Fleet. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1559-60; see
supra note 105 for a description of Fleet's activities with the debtor.
107. See Glick & Nulton, supra note 12.
108. Id.
109. M. Joan Cobb, Where Will It End? Increased Risks to Lenders Under CER-
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the previous Mirabile interpretation of the "participating in management" phrase of CERCLA section 101(20)(A)."O
Not all commenters agree that the Fleet Factors decision was
an extreme departure from earlier interpretations of the participating in management standard."' According to this view, the
full context of the court's holding is that a lender must actually
participate in the financial management of a facility before a court
will scrutinize the lender's capacity to influence the facility's hazardous waste practices." 12 The Eleventh Circuit did say that a secured creditor should be allowed to monitor any aspect of a
debtor's business. 1 ' 3 The court would even permit creditors to
become involved in "occasional and discrete financial decisions
relating to the protection of its security interest," without incurring liability.' '4 Regardless of the true scope of the holding, however, the Fleet Factors decision is important because of the effect
that it had on lenders who were more reluctant to extend credit
due to the perceived expansion of the risk of CERCLA liability.' '5
The Eleventh Circuit felt that its decision would encourage
lenders to engage in complete pre-loan investigations of prospective borrowers, to make certain that any potential environmental
risk is discovered. 1 6 Creditors would also be encouraged, according to the court, to continue to monitor the environmental
policies and practices of their debtors to ensure compliance with
17
required governmental standards.'
CLA Secured Creditor Exemption Law, 40

WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 249
(1991).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). See, e.g., Guidice v. BFG Electroplating &
Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 562 (1987) (monitoring of accounts, on-site inspections, assistance in loan negotiations and loan workout was permitted within security interest exemption); United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,994, 20,996-97 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985) (involvement in financial decisions and general financial advice did not constitute impermissible participation
in management).
111. See, e.g., John P. C. Fogarty, The Legal Case Against Lender Liability, 21
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,243 (May 1991).
112. Id. This means the security holder must first become involved in the
management of the facility and that the extent of the involvement must be at
such a level that an inference could be drawn that the holder had the ability to
influence the environmental operations of the facility. Id.
113. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
114. Id.
115. Glick & Nulton, supra note 12.
116. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558-59.
117. Id. The court of appeals seemed to ignore other public policy ramifications of its decision, however, such as the possible denial of credit in the future to companies in environmentally sensitive industries, particularly small
businesses. Madden, supra note 105, at 155-59.
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Critics of the Fleet Factors decision have asserted that such a
strict reading of the security interest exemption will not result in
the benefits contemplated by the court." 8 The lack of specific
judicial guidelines may actually make lenders fearful that any direct involvement in the borrower's activities, especially concerning hazardous waste policies, will result in a loss of their security
interest exemption." 9 Therefore, it has been suggested that,
as a result of the Fleet Factors decision, lenders may become less
likely to investigate or monitor a borrower's environmental
20
practices. 1
Lenders did receive some relief in a decision by the Ninth
Circuit approximately three months after the Fleet Factors decision. In In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.,121 a port authority issued an industrial revenue bond financing of a lead recycling plant, with the
port authority acquiring title to the property through a sale and
leaseback arrangement with Bergsoe Metal Corporation (Bergsoe
Metal). 122
As a result of financial difficulties at the plant, Bergsoe Metal
was placed into involuntary bankruptcy. 12 3 Subsequently, Bergsoe Metal was also sued as a result of the release of hazardous
waste materials at the site, and filed a third party complaint
against the port authority seeking indemnification under CERCLA. l2 4 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district
court to grant the port authority's motion for summary
25
judgment. 1
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the port authority did not
participate in the management of the facility, since it did not engage in any actual managerial activities. 126 While not expressly
118. Madden, supra note 105, at 155-59.
119. Id.

120. Id.
121. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
122. Id. at 669-70. The port authority received a promissory note and a
mortgage on the plant. Id. at 670. The transaction was determined to constitute
a security interest, and not a true lease, since the rental payments owed by Bergsoe Metal to the port authority were exactly the amount due to retire the debt
service on the bonds, and there was a provision for Bergsoe Metal to purchase
the facility for a nominal sum when the debt was paid. Id. at 670, 673.

123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 673.
126. Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 672. The court of appeals also held that although
the port technically held title through the leaseback arrangement in the financing, the port was not liable under CERCLA as an owner of the facility. Id. at
671. This decision would seem to run counter to the idea expressed by the
court in Maryland Bank & Trust that a creditor who holds title to a facility cannot
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disagreeing with the holding in Fleet Factors, the court did state
that a lender must actually engage in management activities, not
just have the unexercised right to do so, to risk the loss of the
27
security interest exemption.1
The Bergsoe holding seemed to repudiate the statement in
Fleet Factors that the unexercised capacity to engage in management of the borrower's operations could subject lenders to the
loss of the exemption.' 2 8 However, even though Bergsoe was a
more favorable holding for lenders, the case still failed to establish specific guidelines regarding permissible activities.' 2 9 Therefore, in the absence of some clarification from EPA or Congress,
uncertainty continues to exist as to the types of activities that
would cause a lender to be considered an "operator" of its
debtor's facility or to have "participated in the management" of
0
the facility. 13
2.

Lender Liability Through Ownership of the Facility

There has also been disagreement in the courts concerning
whether a lender will lose the protection of the security interest
exemption if the lender legally obtains title to the facility. The
first court to address this issue was the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in United States v.
Mirabile.13
In Mirabile, American Bank & Trust (ABT) had foreclosed on
real property in which it had a security interest after its debtor
had filed for bankruptcy. 32 ABT was the highest bidder for the
property at the foreclosure sale, but assigned its bid four months
33
later without having perfected title.'
be eligible for the security interest exemption. For a discussion of cases involving lender liability as a result of taking legal title to a facility, see infra notes 13161 and accompanying text.
127. Id. at 672-73.
128. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. Some commenters have stated that the
holdings in both Fleet Factors and Bergsoe require that a lender actually participate
in the borrower's management before liability can be imposed. See, e.g., Fogarty,
supra note 111. However, the court of appeals in Fleet Factors seemed to require a
much lower level of lender involvement to satisfy this threshold question than
the Bergsoe court.
129. Glick & Nulton, supra note 12.
130. Steven T. Miano, ProvidingLenders with Superfund Relief, MERGERS & AcQUISITIONS, July/Aug. 1991, at 28.
131. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985). For
a discussion of the facts of this case and its treatment of the lender as an operator of a facility, see supra notes 62-80 and accompanying text.
132. Id. at 20,996.

133. Id.
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The district court ruled that ABT's actions with respect to
foreclosure on the property were solely for the purpose of protecting its security interest, and did not necessarily result in liability under CERCLA.13 4 The Mirabile holding provided lenders
with reassurance that simply foreclosing on and subsequently
purchasing a property were legitimate actions in protecting a se3 5
curity interest.
If lenders were generally pleased with the Mirabile decision,
new doubts were suddenly raised several months later in United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. ,136 a case decided by a federal
district court in Maryland. Maryland Bank & Trust (MB&T) had a

security interest in property on which the borrower allowed hazardous waste materials to be dumped. 3 7 In 1980, the borrower
defaulted on the loan, leading MB&T to foreclose on and
purchase the property in 1981.138 EPA eventually proceeded to

clean up the facility, using CERC[A funds.' 3 9 EPA subsequently
40
sued MB&T to recover the costs incurred in the cleanup.'
The dispute in this case centered on whether MB&T could be
held liable under CERCLA as an owner of the facility in question.14 ' MB&T argued that its foreclosure on and purchase of the
property was simply to protect its security interest, bringing it
under the exemption of CERCLA section 101 (20)(A). 14 2 This position was rejected by the court, which held that the exemption
only applied to parties who held indicia of ownership to protect a
security interest at the time of cleanup. 43 Since the mortgage
134. Id. The court felt that it was unnecessary to resolve whether, under
Pennsylvania law, the successful bid at the sheriff's sale technically vested ABT
with ownership under CERCLA, since the foreclosure was valid under the security interest exemption. Id.
135. Quentel, supra note 1, at 170.
136. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
137. Id. at 575. The borrower conducted a trash and garbage business on
the site involved. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 575-76. Several months after foreclosure, the borrower who had
defaulted notified state authorities about the hazardous waste that had been
dumped. Id. at 575. EPA investigated the claim and confirmed that a removal
action was necessary. Id.
140. Id. at 576. MB&T had previously refused EPA's request to clean up
the site. Id. at 575.
141. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 576.
142. Id. at 579.
143. Id. Prior to reaching this conclusion, the court had ruled that a proper
reading of CERCLA § 107(a)(1) holding the "owner and operator" of a facility
liable really meant that a party did not have to be both an owner and operator to
be deemed liable. Id. at 577-78. A party could be subject to CERCLA liability if
it was either the owner or operator of the facility. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol4/iss1/6
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(the security interest) held by MB&T had terminated at the foreclosure sale, the court ruled that MB&T had full title at the time
of the cleanup, and therefore could not use the security interest
exemption.

44

The court in Maryland Bank & Trust thus defined an "owner"
under CERCLA much differently than the Mirabile court.' 4 5 The
effect of the Maryland Bank & Trust court's narrow construction of
a security interest was to limit the applicability of the exemption
allowed by CERCLA. 14 6 The Maryland Bank & Trust court concluded that a lender which forecloses on a property is no longer
protected by the security interest exemption and therefore is potentially liable for cleanup costs as an owner of a hazardous waste
site. 147
The decision by the court in Maryland Bank & Trust seems to
have been based largely on policy grounds. 48 The court stated
that MB&T purchased the property at foreclosure "not to protect
its security interest, but to protect its investment."'149 The court
was troubled by the prospect of lenders being able to foreclose on
and purchase contaminated properties cheaply, wait for the government to clean up the site, and then profit from a sale of the
50
newly-cleaned property.
The court in Maryland Bank & Trust attempted to distinguish
the Mirabile decision on the basis that the lender in Mirabile only
held the property for four months and promptly assigned its interest.' 5 1 In contrast, MB&T had held title to the property for
144. Id. at 579. The court held that Congress only intended this exemption
to protect lenders in the 13 states which use the title theory of ownership. Id.
Lenders holding a security interest in these states are considered to hold title
while the mortgage is in force, so the court concluded that the exemption was
meant solely to exclude these common-law owners from liability. Id.
145. See Quentel, supra note 1, at 170.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 580.
149. Id. at 579. But see Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996,
where the court expressly declined to impose liability simply to enhance the
public policies of increasing the government's chances of recovering its costs or
ensuring more responsible management of hazardous facilities. Id. The court in
Mirabile felt that the consideration of such policy matters was up to Congress,
which had determined that secured creditors should receive an exemption. Id.
150. Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. at 580. The court felt that the
lenders should protect themselves by making prudent loans, and by investigating and discovering potential problems in their secured properties. Id. The
court did not want CERCLA to turn into an insurance policy for lenders who
had made unwise lending decisions. Id.
151. Id.
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nearly four years, including an entire year before the cleanup con15
ducted by EPA.

2

The analysis in Maryland Bank & Trust regarding the liability
of a lender who forecloses on its security interest was followed by
a Pennsylvania district court in Guidice v. BFG Electroplating& Manufacturing Co. 153 In Guidice, the National Bank of the Commonwealth (the Bank) foreclosed on a mortgage it held on the facility
of a debtor who had defaulted.154 Soon after the Bank purchased
the property at the sheriff's sale, the hazardous wastes were discovered on the site, and cleanup costs were sought from the
Bank. 155
After deciding that the Bank was not liable under CERCLA
for its activities prior to foreclosure, the court in Guidice specifically disagreed with the Mirabile rationale for the period after the
Bank foreclosed. 156 The court instead adopted the reasoning of
the court in Maryland Bank & Trust, holding that when a lender
forecloses on and subsequently repurchases a property, the
lender is no longer protected by the security interest exemption. 157 Such a lender, the court held, should have the same level
15 8
of liability as any other purchaser of the property.
The Maryland Bank & Trust and Guidice decisions caused alarm
in the lending community since they apparently forced lenders to
choose between exercising their right to foreclose and the risk of
possible liability for potentially large cleanup costs. 159 These decisions created uncertainty as to when a lender would be deter152. Id. at 579. However, the court in Maryland Bank & Trust did not feel
compelled to follow the Mirabile court's interpretation of the security interest

exemption, stating that "[t]o the extent to which [Mirabile] suggests a rule of
broader application, this Court respectfully disagrees." Id. at 580.
153. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989). For a discussion of the court's reasoning in Guidice concerning a lender's liability as an operator of a facility, see
supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
154. Id. at 559.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 563. The court felt that the Mirabile decision would provide
lenders who purchase properties after foreclosure with special treatment and
would frustrate the goal of CERCLA to distribute the costs of cleaning up facilities. Id.
157. Id.
158. Guidice, 732 F. Supp. at 563. The Guidice court found persuasive the
rationale of the court in Maryland Bank & Trust, that secured lenders who repurchase foreclosed property would receive a windfall from government cleanup of
the land. Id. The court found that there was no reason for these lenders to
receive special treatment once they no longer held a security interest in the
property. Id.

159. Quentel, supra note 1, at 179.
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mined to be the "owner" of a facility. 160 Lenders have argued
that these holdings render security interests in such property ineffective protection for their investments and desire clarification of
when ownership under CERCLA will attach.' 6 1
III.

POTENTIAL RESPONSES TO THE RISK OF LENDER LIABILITY

The lack of consistency and guidance provided by the decisions summarized above has created demands from the lending
community for governmental intervention. 1 62 Despite the inconsistency in the interpretation of the security interest exemption,
the United States Supreme Court has not yet reviewed this issue.
In fact, the Court denied certiorari in the United States v. Fleet Fac63
tors case. '
In response to the demands for clarification, legislation has
been proposed in Congress to ease lenders' concerns. 164 Additionally, EPA has issued final regulations in an attempt to clarify
65
the scope of the security interest exemption.'
A.

Clarification Offered by EPA

EPA recognized that the decisions by the courts interpreting
the security interest exemption have caused uncertainty among
lenders. 16 6 These decisions have especially led to confusion
among lenders as to the range of activities that a secured creditor
160. See Lettow, supra note 13.
161. Id.
162. Witnesses Tell House Banking Panel Legislation Needed to Clarify CERCLA,
Banking Rep. (BNA) (July 15, 1991).
163. 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
164. For a discussion of the pending legislation, see infra notes 240-54 and
accompanying text.
165. Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). EPA indicated that it received over 300 written
comments on the proposed rules which were published in the Federal Register
on June 24, 1991. Mitchell, supra note 10. In addressing the comments made to
the proposed rules, EPA indicated that the key issue was to balance the practical
difficulties encountered by lenders in dealing with defaulted loans with the need
to protect the environment. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,366.
166. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344-45. The area identified by EPA as causing the
most uncertainty was the extent to which a secured creditor could become involved in the affairs of its debtor without incurring liability under CERCLA. Id.
at 18,344. EPA indicated that the new rules would pertain to persons who maintain indicia of ownership primarily to protect their security interest. Id. EPA
identified these "persons" as including "privately-owned and governmental financial institutions, governmental receivers, conservators, loan guarantors, and
lending or other governmental entities ... ." Id.
In the same action, EPA also promulgated rules pertaining to the liability of
governmental entities that acquire ownership of hazardous waste sites involunta-
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can take in protecting its security, without being subject to CERCLA liability for "participating in the management" of the facility. 16 7 The courts that have interpreted "participation in
management," according to EPA, have failed to articulate a clear
standard that security holders can safely follow.' 6 8
EPA organized its attempt to clarify the scope of the security
interest exemption by explaining the meaning of three key terms
in CERCLA section 101(20)(A) that are not defined in the statute. 169 The agency has attempted to identify: (1) which "indicia
of ownership" are covered by the exemption; (2) the meaning of
the requirement that the security interest be held "primarily to
protect [a] security interest"; and (3) the activities that will and
will not cause a lender to be deemed to be "participating in the
70
management" of a facility.'
"Indicia of ownership" is defined by EPA as "evidence of interests in real or personal property."' 17 EPA made a policy decision that the exemption should protect a broad range of secured
transactions, with the only qualification being that the ownership
interest be held primarily to protect the security interest.72 A
broad definition allows the exemption to be applied on a consistent basis nationally, regardless of the manner in which a particular state's law characterizes a specific transaction.' 7 3
ily. Id. Those rules are beyond the scope of this Comment and therefore will
not be specifically addressed.
167. Id. at 18,345. EPA noted that some of the common activities that secured lenders engage in include "monitoring facility operations, requiring compliance with legal requirements and compliance-related activities, refinancing or
undertaking loan workouts, providing financial advice, and undertaking other
similar actions that may affect the financial, management and operational aspects
of a business .... " Id.
168. Id. EPA also noted that neither the statute nor the legislative history
of CERCLA provide a precise indication of the activities that do or do not constitute "participation in management." Id.
169. Id. at 18,374.
170. Id. These are the same terms that EPA defined in its proposed regulations. See Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,798 (1991) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300) (proposed June 24, 1991). Based on the comments received on the proposed rules, however, the specific approach in defining these terms was revised by EPA in the final rules. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,374.
171. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,374.
172. Id. at 18,351. EPA declined to create a special CERCLA-specific definition for a security interest that would explicitly include some forms of transactions and exclude others. Id. Allowing the broad, nonexclusive definition allows
lenders the flexibility to structure their financial arrangements without the fear
that CERCLA liability could attach based on a technicality. Id.
173. Id. Generally, the security holder must show "evidence of a security
interest, evidence of an interest in a security interest, or evidence of an interest
in real or personal property securing a loan or other obligation, including any
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The final regulations include indicia of ownership obtained
as a result of a foreclosure in the type of security interests that are
eligible for the exemption. 174 This is extremely significant in
light of the decisions by the courts in United States v. Mayland Bank
& Trust' 7 5 and Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing
Co. ,176 which held that the exemption could be lost when a security holder forecloses on the security interest.177 EPA recognized
that often the only realistic course of action for a lender is to foreclose on and sell the property in order to recover on the debt. 78
The lender can only avail itself of this protection if it abides
by certain guidelines described in the rules pertaining to disposal
of the property.179 The steps that a lender must take in offering
the property for sale are flexible, but provide criteria for determining whether an offer must be accepted.' 80 EPA also provided
legal or equitable title to real or personal property acquired incident to foreclosure and its equivalents." Id. at 18,382. The rule provides a non-exhaustive list
of such security interests, including: mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, surety
bonds and guarantees of obligations, title held pursuant to a lease financing
transaction in which the lessor does not select initially the leased property, legal
or equitable title obtained pursuant to foreclosure, and their equivalents. Id.
Evidence of such interests also include assignments, pledges, or other rights to
or other forms of encumbrance against property. Id.
174. Id. EPA specifically noted that certain actions are "necessary incidents" to protection of a security interest. Id. at 18,377. These actions include
foreclosure, purchase at foreclosure sale, acquisition or assignment of title in
lieu of foreclosure, repossession in the case of a lease financing transaction, acquisition of a fight to possession of title, or any other formal or informal manner
by which the lender acquires possession of the borrower's property for subsequent disposition in partial or full satisfaction of the underlying obligation. Id.
175. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
176. 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
177. For a discussion of the holdings in Maryland Bank & Trust and Guidice,
see notes 136-61 and accompanying text. It is interesting to note that EPA cites
these cases, among others, for supporting the proposition that foreclosure and
the taking of title does not automatically void the exemption. 57 Fed. Reg.
18,377. EPA disagreed with comments indicating that these cases established a
per se rule that a foreclosing lender surrenders its security interest for full legal
title as owner of the property. Id. at 18,361. EPA asserted that the court in
Maryland Bank & Trust specifically declined to decide this issue and found the
lender liable because the property was retained for four years, with no evidence
of any attempt to resell the property. Id. at 18,361-62. In Guidice, although the
court claimed that the lender should be held liable for CERCLA costs to the
same extent as any other successful bidder, EPA stated that this holding was
restricted to the facts in that case, where the lender apparently outbid other
bidders who offered a fair price for the property. Id.
178. 57 Fed. Reg. at 18,377.
179. Id. Generally, the regulations are intended to assure that the property
is only being held to protect the lender's security interest and not for any other
purpose. Id.
180. Id. EPA agreed with comments to the proposed rules stating that
there were numerous methods by which property can be divested, and that lend-
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lenders with a "bright-line" method to follow, which describes
specific steps that a lender may take that will serve as conclusive
evidence that the lender is attempting to dispose of the property
'
"in a reasonably expeditious manner. "181
Recognizing that economic conditions, the state of the property itself, or other factors may make a property unmarketable despite acceptable efforts by the lender, EPA has not imposed a time
requirement for the lender to dispose of the property. 8 2 However, a lender which has foreclosed on property cannot ignore,
83
reject, or outbid offers of fair consideration for the property.'
EPA feels that a rejection of or failure to act upon a valid offer is
evidence that the lender is maintaining its interest in the property
for investment purposes, and not as security for the loan obligation.1 8 4 EPA also indicated its intention to seek recovery of any
ers would be unduly restricted by being forced to adhere to one specific method
of divestiture that might not be appropriate. Id. at 18,363. Since any of these
methods could be appropriate in given circumstances, EPA changed the final
rule to contain the general requirement that permits lenders to use commercially reasonable means to dispose of the property. Id.
181. Id. In order to establish that it is seeking to divest itself of the property, a lender must, within 12 months after acquiring marketable title, list the
property with a broker, dealer or agent who deals in that type of property, or
advertise the property as being for sale in a suitable publication. Id. at 18,378.
182. Id. A lender wishing to use the "bright-line" method must list or advertise the property within 12 months. Id. Because a variety of factors may affect the time when a lender is permitted to offer the foreclosed-on property for
sale, EPA stated that the 12 month period will begin to run from the date that
the holder may legally offer the property for sale. Id. at 18,364. However, if the
lender did not diligently attempt to acquire marketable title, the 12 month period will begin to run from the date of foreclosure. Id. at 18,384.
183. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,378. Specifically, a lender will lose the benefit of the
security interest exemption if, at any time after six months following the acquisition of marketable title, the lender rejects or fails to act upon a written, bona fide
offer of fair consideration within 90 days of receipt. Id. The two important components of this analysis are: (i) what constitutes a written, bona fide offer, and (ii)
what should be deemed to be fair consideration. EPA defines a written, bona
fide offer as "a legally enforceable, commercially reasonable, cash offer solely
for the foreclosed vessel or facility, including all material terms of the transaction, from a ready, willing, and able purchaser who demonstrates to the holder's
satisfaction the ability to perform." Id. at 18,384. An offer is considered to be
for "fair consideration" if it is for an amount equal to or greater than the sum of
the outstanding principal plus any unpaid interest, rents, or penalties, and other
reasonable costs incurred by the lender in relation to the property. Id. EPA
agreed with several comments to the proposed rules which stated that there are
situations in which a lender has a duty, imposed by federal or state law, to protect other parties by requiring a bid in excess of the amount owed to the security
holder itself. Id. at 18,364-65. Therefore, a foreclosing lender under such a
duty may still be deemed to be primarily protecting its security interest even
though it rejects an offer that otherwise meets the definition of fair consideration. Id. at 18,384.
184. Id. at 18,378.
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"windfall" received by a lender in excess of the balance due that
lender, which results from a publicly-financed cleanup of the facil85
ity that enhances the value of the property.'
Following foreclosure, the final regulations provide lenders
with broad discretion in the actions they may take without losing
the exemption. EPA decided that lenders should not be penalized for actions that are designed to protect or preserve the value
of the asset, including measures taken to prevent future releases
or to ensure safe public access. 186 In addition, under the new
regulations lenders may either "wind up" or maintain the operations of a foreclosed-on facility without losing the security interest
exemption. 8 7 Although permitting a lender to assert such control over the facility would seem to violate the requirement that
the lender not "participate in the management" of the facility,
EPA held that this type of activity was consistent with the usual
manner in which foreclosing security holders operate.' 8 8 Therefore, in order to give real meaning to the exemption, EPA felt it
was important to allow lenders the ability to determine on an individual basis whether the facility's operations should be maintained.' 8 9 However, the lender would face liability for any
contamination for which the lender is responsible subsequent to
185. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,365. Pursuant to CERCLA § 107(l), a lien in favor of
the United States is imposed on a property when EPA conducts a response action to clean up the facility. Id. at 18,368. EPA agreed that this is not a "Superlien" that takes precedence over pre-existing valid and superior liens, but stated
that the lien is also not junior to any and all liens. Id. The lending community
claimed that principles of equity and unjust enrichment would give EPA the
right to recover any windfall, and that it was unlikely that such a windfall would
ever occur. James P. O'Brien & Jeremy A. Gibson, Final EPA Rule Allows Traditional Lender Activities Without Superfund Liabilities, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at
326, 329 (May 15, 1992).
186. 57 Fed. Reg. at 18,378. EPA recognized that some steps taken by the
lender, although evidencing control over the facility, are "necessary components
of holding ownership indicia primarily to protect a security interest." Id. at
18,379.
187. Id. "Winding up" the operations includes actions "that are necessary
to close down a facility's operations, secure the site, and otherwise protect the
value of the foreclosed assets for subsequent sale or liquidation." Id. A lender
choosing to continue the operations of the facility is still subject to the regulations requiring that the lender seek to sell or dispose of the facility. Id.
188. Id. at 18,366. A central premise for EPA in promulgating these regulations was that Congress did not intend to prevent security holders from conducting their business according to their normal lending practices. Id. A lender
found to have "participated in management" prior to foreclosure has violated the
terms of CERCLA § 101(20)(A), and is not eligible for the exemption. Id. at
18,384.
189. Id. at 18,366. EPA also agreed with comments to the proposed rules
stating that maintenance of the facility's operations could enhance the value for
subsequent sale, generate funds to assist with possible cleanup costs, and pro-
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foreclosure. 90
The phrase "primarily to protect the security interest" is
used by EPA to determine whether the security holder's indicia of
ownership brings it within the definition of "owner or opera92
tor."'91 The primary purpose of the holder's security interest'
must be to secure payment or performance of a loan or other obligation.' 9 3 Interests held primarily for purposes other than securing a loan or other obligation would not qualify for the
94
exemption. 1
Since the decision by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v.
Fleet Factors,195 perhaps the most discussion and uncertainty in the
area of lender liability has involved the meaning of the term "participation in management." EPA recognized that it would be an
impossible task to try to identify every. action or situation that a
security holder may take and indicate whether such action constituted participation in management. 96 Therefore, EPA adopted
a general test that would take a "functional approach" in determining whether the lender's involvement in the operational aspects of a facility should subject the lender to liability. 19 7 EPA
vide economic advantages such as employment and the production of goods and
services. Id.
190. Id. at 18,367. For example, the lender would be responsible for any
damage caused as the result of having arranged for the disposal of hazardous
substances, under CERCLA section 107(a)(3), or for having accepted hazardous
substances for transport and disposal at a facility, under CERCLA section
107(a)(4). Id.
191. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,374.
192. Id. at 18,375. EPA stated that a transaction giving rise to a security
interest "is one that provides the holder with recourse against real or personal
property of the person pledging the security." Id.
193. Id. EPA identified certain transactions that qualify as security interests, assuming that the interest is held to secure an obligation. Id. These transactions include mortgages, deeds of trust, liens, and titles held pursuant to lease
financing transactions. Id. Transactions from which a security interest may arise
include sale-and-leasebacks, conditional sales, installment sales, trust receipt
transactions, certain assignments, factoring agreements, or accounts receivable
financing agreements. Id.
194. Id. For example, holding property for investment purposes, apparently in the hope of appreciation, rather than as security, would not be a valid
purpose. Id. EPA recognized, however, that a lender could legitimately have
additional reasons for maintaining the indicia, as long as those reasons are secondary to the security interest. Id.
195. 901 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991). For
a discussion of the holding in Fleet Factors, see supra notes 90-120 and accompanying text.
196. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,379.
197. Id. The test adopted by EPA is not concerned with a lender's unexercised right to influence the operations of a facility. Id. This should ease concerns
of lenders who had focused on the language used by the court in Fleet Factors
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also specified certain activities that are deemed to be consistent
with protecting a security interest and therefore would not be
considered evidence of participation in management. 9 8
The goal of EPA in promulgating its general test of management participation was to "assess the effect of a holder's involvement in a facility on the hazardous substances present there."' 9 9
In assessing the lender's involvement, EPA believed that a distinction should be made between the "control" that a lender in a
decisionmaking position would have versus the "influence" that a
lender not in the decisionmaking hierarchy could exert. 20 0 The
general test that EPA has promulgated is a two-prong test that
will impose liability in instances where a lender: (i) has assumed
decisionmaking control over the borrower's environmental compliance practices, or (ii) has exercised responsibility at the level of
20 1
day-to-day management of the borrower's enterprise.
indicating that lenders with the "capacity" to affect a facility's operational decisions could be subject to CERCLA liability. See Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557.
EPA also specifically focused its rule on the operational aspects of the management of the facility, stating that involvement solely in financial or administrative
matters of the debtor would not be deemed participation in management. 57
Fed. Reg. 18,379.
198. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,375. For a discussion of the specific activities EPA has
indicated are not evidence of participation in management, see infra notes 20516 and accompanying text.
199. Id. at 18,359. According to EPA, a lender which simply engages in its
normal course of business should not be subject to liability under CERCLA. Id.
On the other hand, EPA indicated that liability should be imposed on a lender
which actually performs activities which constitute management of a facility. Id.
It is interesting to note that although the rules require direct, actual involvement
in the facility, EPA did not consider this to have overruled the decision in Fleet
Factors. Id. at 18,369. EPA stated that the Fleet Factors court required actual involvement in a borrower's facility, as did the court in In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.,
910 F.2d 668, 672-73 (9th Cir. 1990). 57 Fed. Reg. 18,369. Instead, EPA saw
the regulations as resolving a question left unanswered by Fleet Factors, concerning the extent of involvement required to support the inference that a lender
could be affecting a borrower's environmental practices. Id. In fact, in subsequent litigation continuing the Fleet Factorscase, EPA has argued that Fleet maintained pervasive control of the facility, and therefore should face CERCLA
liability under both prongs of the "participating in management" rule promulgated in the final regulations. U.S. Says Fleet Factors Liable Under Rule Because It
Controlled Activities at Georgia Site, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 1196, 1197
(Aug. 14, 1992).
200. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,369. EPA felt that this distinction was a critical one
because the borrower could be "influenced" by a great many parties with whom
it transacts business. Id. According to EPA, liability should not attach to any of
these parties, no matter how substantial their influence, as long as the ultimate
decision was still made by the borrower. Id. It would seem that there would be a
gray area, however, where a party with tremendous "influence" over the borrower would in effect be operating the facility if the borrower did not feel truly
free to decline to accept the "suggestions" offered by that party.
201. Id. at 18,359. The first prong of the test states that a lender partici-
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A lender does not have to actually cause a release at the facility in order to be found to be exercising control over the borrower's environmental practices under the second prong. 20 2 The

second prong was structured to prevent a lender from maintaining complete control of the facility except for the environmental
compliance practices.2 0 3 EPA did not want lenders to be able to
fully operate a facility, but artificially "carve out" environmental
20 4
matters in order to avoid liability.

In addition to the general test to determine when a lender is
participating in management, EPA also specified certain activities
that would not by themselves cause liability to be imposed on the
lender. 20 5 As a threshold, EPA has decided that activities taken
prior to or at the inception of the loan obligation are not relevant
in determining whether a lender has participated in managepates in management where the lender exercises decisionmaking control over
the borrower's "hazardous substance handling or disposal practices." Id. at
18,383. The second prong of the test imposes liability when a lender has assumed managerial control of the borrower's business. Id. This control can be
manifested by management of: (i) the borrower's environmental compliance
practices or (ii) all or substantially all the borrower's operations other than environmental compliance. Id. at 18,383. EPA only considers the operational aspects of the borrower's business in determining whether the lender has taken
over day-to-day management decisionmaking. Id. Operational aspects of the
business include such functions as facility or plant manager, operations
manager, chief operating officer, or chief executive officer. Id. Financial or administrative aspects of the business, such as credit manager, accounts payable/receivable manager, personnel manager, controller, or chief financial
officer, are considered to be within the usual functions that a security holder may
perform and therefore are not viewed as evidence of participation in management. Id. at 18,360.
202. Id. at 18,359. The key to determining liability is the actual control that
the lender has over the disposal or handling of hazardous waste at the facility,
and is not dependent on any specific environmental outcome. Id.
203. Id. The second prong of the test seems to be similar to the standard
employed by the court in United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985). In Mirabile, the court held that assumption of the day-to-day decisionmaking of a borrower, not simply participation in
the borrower's financial matters, was required before liability would be imposed
on a lender. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20,995-96. The new rules seem to
contemplate that same level of involvement in order to void the security interest
exemption due to "participation in management."
204. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,360. EPA felt that a lender's ability to "carve out" the
environmental responsibilities from its purview was itself evidence that the
lender had assumed sufficient responsibility to be considered to be participating
in management. Id.
205. Id. at 18,375. The specific activities approved by EPA were not intended to be the only activities that lenders could undertake without voiding the
exemption. Id. at 18,376. Other activities are not automatically considered evidence of participation in management, and must be addressed on a case-by-case
basis using the general rule provided by the regulations. Id.
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ment.2 0 6 Since no indicia of ownership exists prior to the time
the security interest is created by the loan obligation, EPA felt the
security interest exemption and the "participation in management" test should not be applied to these activities. 20 7 The
lender may also require an environmental inspection of the facil20 8 If
ity serving as security prior to finalizing the loan obligation.
an inspection is conducted and contamination is revealed, the
lender may take actions it deems appropriate from a broad variety
of permissible responses. 20 9 A lender may also require a borrower to clean up the facility or to comply with any applicable law
210
or regulation as a condition of making the loan.
A lender is permitted under the rules to "police" the loan or
security interest prior to foreclosure. 2 1 ' The lender can require
and enforce financial, environmental and other warranties, conditions, covenants, representations, or promises made by the borrower, in contractual or other documents. 21 2 Requiring such
warranties and covenants, however, does not mean that the
lender is expected to serve as an insurer of the environmental
2 13
safety of the facility.
206. Id. at 18,376. Some of the activities that EPA indicated would not be
relevant include negotiations concerning the structure and terms of the loan,
and other advice, suggestions, or counseling provided to the borrower. Id.
207. Id. EPA noted that a lender which gets too involved in a prospective
borrower's business prior to the loan obligation could face CERCLA liability as
an operator of the facility, as an "arranger" for disposal under CERCLA section
107(a)(3) or as a "transporter" under CERCLA section 107(a)(4). Id. at 18,356.
208. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,376. The lender can have the inspection performed
to assist it with risk assessment or for any other business purpose. Id. In addition, the lender's ability to take advantage of the security interest exemption will
be unaffected by whether the lender required an inspection or failed to require
an inspection. Id. EPA found no theory in CERCLA or case law that would
impose liability on this basis. Id. at 18,353.
209. Id. For example, the lender may decline to make the loan, may require
other non-contaminated property as security, or may decide to make the loan if
it determines that the risk of default or the extent of contamination is sufficiently
small. Id. at 18,376-77.
210. Id. at 18,377. The lender can require that the borrower's compliance
be either prior or subsequent to the time that the lender holds indicia of ownership to protect its security interest. Id. at 18,383.
211. Id. at 18,383. In addition to requiring cleanups and compliance with
applicable laws, policing can include, among other actions, the authority to monitor or inspect the facility, and the ability to monitor the business or financial
condition of the borrower. Id.
212. Id. at 18,383. However, a lender must be cautious in exercising a right
to take control of or direct a facility's activities prior to foreclosure. Such activity
could result in the lender facing liability for having participated in management.
Id. at 18,357.
213. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,377. EPA viewed these warranties and covenants as
deserving the protection of the exemption, since they are intended to ensure
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Once a borrower is experiencing difficulties, lenders may,
consistent with the exemption, engage in "work out" activities
with the borrower prior to foreclosure. 2 14 These activities may be
necessary to protect the security interest from loss. 21 5

The

lender's activities must still be consistent with the general test for
21 6
participation in management promulgated in the rules.
B.

Reactions to the Final EPA Rules

The reactions to the final regulations promulgated by EPA
have been varied. Environmental and industry groups believe
that the new rules are unnecessary and may represent the beginning of an undercutting of CERCLA's liability scheme. 2 17 These
critics assert that there is no lender liability crisis, because so few
lenders have been identified as responsible parties by EPA. 2 18
Moreover, these groups feel that the threat of liability is necessary

in order to force lenders to provide assistance in reducing the risk
of contaminations. 2 19 The environmental groups are concerned
that the incentive to carefully assess loan applicants for environmental risks and to monitor the activities of borrowers will no
longer exist if lenders are not faced with a real risk of CERCLA
liability. 2 20 The environmental groups believe that the concern
that the value of the property is not impaired by a release or contamination. Id.
at 18,356.
214. Id. at 18,383. "Work out" refers to a lender's attempts to "prevent,
cure, or mitigate" a default by the borrower. Id. Work out activities permitted
by EPA include, among others, restructuring the terms of the security interest,
requiring payment of additional rent or interest, exercising forbearance, providing financial or other advice or guidance, and exercising any contractual or legal
right possessed by the lender. Id.
215. Id. at 18,377. Since work out activities are seen as a normal reaction
by a security holder, EPA felt that they were evidence of the lender's interest in
protecting its security. Id.
216. Id.
217. Marianne Lavelle, Both Sides Oppose Rule That Limits Liability of Lenders,
NAT'L L.J., May 11, 1992, at 19, 24. See also Commenters, supra note 17.
218. Commenters, supra note 17. EPA has stated that in the history of the
Superfund program, it has identified only eight lenders as responsible parties,
out of many thousands of identified parties. Id. Environmental groups claim
that lenders are simply seeking a special exemption to which they are no more
entitled than other potentially responsible parties. Id.
219. Lavelle, supra note 217, at 19. The environmental groups believe that
the possibility of large cleanup costs was the primary reason for the increase in
environmental studies and monitoring that lenders have conducted in recent
years. Id.
220. Id. Environmental groups note that such activities became much more
commonplace after the decision in United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550
(11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991), made the risk of liability seem
more imminent to lenders. Lavelle, supra note 217, at 24.
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expressed by the court in Maryland Bank & Trust, that lenders will
be encouraged by the rules to hold property until the government
or another PRP cleans it up, will become reality. 2 2 1 The environmental groups would at minimum like to see lenders have to earn
the security interest exemption by conducting pre-loan environmental audits and continuing to monitor the facility during the
2 22
life of the loan.
Large corporations and industrial groups such as the Chemical Manufacturers Association also oppose the new rules limiting
lender liability. 223 These groups assert that they currently bear
the largest burden of CERCLA liability and do not want to be left
with even more of the responsibility as other sectors of the economy, such as lenders, are given special protection. 22 4 The goal of
the corporate groups is not to eliminate the exemption for secured lenders, but instead to defeat the liability scheme of CER2 25
CLA completely.
Lender groups and their supporters, on the other hand, generally see the new rules as a positive step in their attempt to gain
protection from liability for contamination caused by other parties. 2 26 The lenders believe that a broad interpretation of the exemption is necessary to change the perception that facilities with
potential for environmental liability present a much greater than
normal commercial risk. 2 2 7 A relatively expansive view of the exemption is required, lenders assert, because under the present
221. Commenters, supra note 17. For a discussion of the decision in Maryland
Bank & Trust, see supra notes 136-52 and accompanying text. Since the rules
only require that the lender make certain efforts to sell the property after foreclosure and not reject valid offers, environmental groups feel that these provisions grant "near absolute immunity" to lenders' post-foreclosure activities. Id.
222. Commenters, supra note 17. These requirements were included in EPA's
initial draft proposal that was "leaked" to the public in September, 1990. Mitchell, supra note 10. A second draft of the proposed rules did not include these
audits as requirements, but indicated that such inspections would be considered
highly probative of the lender's intention to act in concert with the exemption.
Id.
223. Lavelle, supra note 217, at 24.
224. Id. Although the corporate groups admit that the new regulations
protecting lenders seem fair, they claim that the liability scheme of CERCLA was
not intended to be fair and that liability should not be avoided because of political pressure. Id.
225. Id. The corporate groups would like to have the "reasonableness"
that they see in the security interest exemption applied to all parties when CERCLA is considered for reauthorization in 1995. Id.
226. Id.
227. Commenters, supra note 17. Thus lenders feel that the argument of the
environmental groups, that actual past liability of lenders has been negligible, is
not relevant to lenders' concerns. Id.
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uncertain conditions lenders will be extremely reluctant to make
loans to borrowers with such facilities. 22 8 As a result, many areas
of the business community, particularly small businesses, would
2 29
be adversely affected by an inability to obtain financing.
In response to the claims that the regulations will result in a
reduction of environmental studies and monitoring, lenders assert that regular market forces will provide motivation to continue
such assessments. 23 0 Lenders also claim that the new rules' reliance on market forces will provide benefits to other groups while
still encouraging the protection of the environment. 23 ' Lenders
who feel less threatened by CERCLA liability will be more likely
to provide capital to small businesses, particularly those in industries posing a high risk of environmental problems. 23 2 Lenders
also claim that the new regulations will encourage lending to
businesses which plan to use the funds to clean up property which
23 3
has already been contaminated.
Although generally encouraged by EPA's regulations, lenders continued to express concerns that the new rules are not adequate. 2 34 For example, lenders have expressed concern that the
regulations do not provide any protection for trustees administering estates containing contaminated property.2 3 5 In addition,
while the rules provide guidance to lenders as to how EPA will
228. Id.
229. Id.

230. Id. According to lenders, they would still not make loans to environmentally unsound businesses, or allow borrowers to contaminate the property
serving as security, since the result would be a decrease in the value of the collateral, to the possible detriment of the lender. Id.
231. O'Brien & Gibson, supra note 185, at 328.
232. Id. Businesses which have been foreclosed on would also be more
likely to be allowed to keep operating, since the new rules do not consider such
actions to be participation in management. See 57 Fed. Reg. 18,366.
233. Todd Woody, EPA Lender Liability Rules Comfort Banks, a Little, THE RECORDER, June 10, 1992, at 3. Some commenters, however, feel that while the
new rules may encourage foreclosure to be used more readily as a remedy, lenders will remain very cautious in providing money to businesses which present
large risks of hazardous releases. Steve Cocheo, New EPA Rule Helps, But Bankers
Hope for New Law, ABA BANKING J., July 1992, at 13.
234. Woody, supra note 233, at 3.
235. Id. EPA stated that the final rule was not extended to cover trustees
because the agency did not see any basis for construing the security interest
exemption as applying to trustees, since indicia of ownership would not be held
primarily to protect a security interest. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,349. EPA also indicated
that the need for such an exemption was not apparent since it claimed that a
trustee would not be personally liable "solely because a trust asset is contaminated by hazardous substances." Id. The assets of the trust, however, would
generally be available to help pay for cleanup costs of a trust property. Id.
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view their actions under CERCLA, lenders may still face potential
liability under analogous state environmental laws and other federal laws such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA).236
Lenders are especially concerned that the protection offered
by EPA in the new regulations will not help them in suits brought
by private third parties.2 3 7 EPA attempted to extend its interpretation of the exemption to cover third parties by making the regulation a part of the National Contingency Plan (NCP), a group of
EPA regulations which govern CERCLA cleanups. 238 The regulations have already been challenged in court, however, and there is
concern in the lending community that they will not be upheld. 239
236. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990). RCRA covers hazardous waste practices at active facilities, while CERCLA generally applies to
releases at abandoned sites. Lavelle, supra note 217, at 24. In the preamble to
the regulations, EPA stated that since there was no evidence that Congress intended CERCLA to preempt any other law, there was no principle under which
the regulations could be used to make them apply to a lender's potential liability
under other state or federal laws. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,349-50. EPA did indicate that
RCRA section 9003(h)(9), which includes a security holder exemption similar to
CERCLA section 101(20)(A), should be interpreted similarly to the CERCLA
exemption. Id. at 18,349. In order to formalize this interpretation, EPA stated
that it has begun to work on a proposed rule that would define the RCRA exemption similar to the new CERCLA rules. Id.
237. Lavelle, supra note 217, at 24. "Third parties" are generally entities
and individuals who have begun paying for the cleanup of a facility and bring
suit against other potentially responsible parties under the broad joint and several liability scheme of CERCLA. Id.
238. O'Brien & Gibson, supra note 185, at 329. As part of the NCP, the
regulations are legislative rules and theoretically are binding in suits brought
against lenders by third parties. Id. EPA asserted in the preamble to the regulations that its definition of the scope of the security interest exemption was a
substantive rule which had undergone notice-and-comment pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act and therefore applied to all relevant actions, whether
initiated by EPA or any other person. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,368. Even if the rule was
only viewed as an interpretation of the exemption, EPA claimed that its guidance
would be given substantial deference by courts in third party actions. Id.
239. EPA stated in the preamble that based on administrative law, the regulations would be binding on third parties unless challenged within 90 days of
promulgation. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,369. On July 28, 1992, the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) and the Michigan Attorney General filed separate suits
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Michigan, CMA
Challenge EPA Regulation Shielding Lenders from CERCLA Liability, 23 Env't Rep.
(BNA) No. 15, at 1142 (Aug. 7, 1992). The Michigan suit asserted that EPA had
exceeded its authority in promulgating the rules, and that the rules would encourage lenders to operate contaminated facilities. Id. A particular area of concern noted by a Michigan assistant attorney general was the ability of lenders
under the final regulations to foreclose on property and to take an active role in
the operation of the facility after foreclosure. Id. CMA asserted that EPA does
not have general rule-making authority under CERCLA because it is a liability
scheme, not a regulatory statute. Id. EPA was able to promulgate the rules by
making them a part of the NCP, but CMA claims that this was invalid because the
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Legislative Responses

The concerns voiced by lenders that the final regulations may
not provide adequate protection from CERCLA liability have
caused them to continue to seek a legislative solution. 240 Several
bills have been proposed in recent years that would address the
lender liability issue in various ways, but for a variety of reasons
these measures have yet to be passed by Congress. A House
bill 24 ' authored by Rep. John LaFalce (D-N.Y.) and a Senate
bill 24 2 introduced by Sen. Jake Garn (R-Utah) offer examples of
proposals intended to deal with the concerns of lenders regarding
24 3
liability under CERCLA.
The LaFalce bill included within the definition of "indicia of
ownership" any interests obtained in the course of protecting the
creditor's security interest, including those acquired through
foreclosure. 244 The secured creditor would have to diligently attempt to dispose of the property on commercially reasonable
terms in order to preserve the exemption. 245 The security holder
would be liable if it caused or worsened a release, to the extent
rules deal with liability, not with the NCP specifically. Id. The American Bankers Association indicated that it would intervene in the suit in support of the
rules, and argued that the regulations simply recognize that lenders should not
be penalized for taking actions that are economically efficient. Id.
240. Cocheo, supra note 233, at 13. In addition to the potential problems
that could be presented by third party suits and application of state and other
federal laws, legislation would make it less likely that lenders would be held liable due to judicial interpretation or changes in philosophy by a new administration. Id.
241. H.R. 1450, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). This bill would amend CERCLA directly and would also extend liability protections under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988 & Supp.
11 1990). The LaFalce bill, which has been reported to have 265 co-sponsors,
may be on hold pending reauthorization of RCRA. Lender Liability Limits in Bank
Reform Bill Cause Concern as EPA Prepares Final Rule, Banking Rep. (BNA), at 453
(Sept. 23, 1991) [hereinafter Liability Limits].
242. S. 651, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1990).
243. Lettow, supra note 13. A third bill, H.R. 1643, sponsored in the House
by Representative Wayne Owens (D-Utah), was also introduced, but not reported out of committee. Mitchell, supra note 10. The Owens bill would retain
the CERCLA definitions of "owner" and "operator" but would conditionally
permit mortgage lenders, insured depository institutions, or federal lending institutions to foreclose. Id. In order to be able to foreclose, the secured creditor
must have conducted an environmental inspection according to guidelines to be
developed by EPA. Id.
244. Lettow, supra note 13. This legislation stalled in the House Banking
Committee pending the publication of the final EPA regulations. Michael Hsu,
Lender Liability Clarification May Come from Hill or EPA; Bankers, Environmentalists
Clash, MORTGAGE COMMENTARY, Nov. 8, 1991, at 1.
245. Lettow, supra note 13.
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that the lender's actions led to the release.2 46
The Garn bill approached the problem in a different way in
that it would amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act,2 4 7 rather

than CERCLA directly. 248 In 1991, the Garn bill had been attached as Title X to a proposed banking and deposit insurance
reform bill that was approved by the Senate Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs Committee in August. 24 9 The proposal was
most recently offered, prior to publication of this Comment, as an
amendment to a housing bill. 2 50 The provisions of the amend-

ment were based on the Title X provisions sponsored by Sen.
Garn, with minor changes to conform more closely with the new
25 1
EPA regulations.
The Garn proposal would limit the liability of an insured depository institution or a mortgage lender for CERCLA cleanup
costs. 2 5 2 A protected lender's liability would be limited to the actual benefit received by the lender from a cleanup conducted by
some other party, although there would be no exclusion for a
lender who caused or contributed to a release. 2 53 Regarding a
lender's participation in management, the Garn proposal provides certain "safe harbors" that would allow lenders to conduct a
variety of management activities without incurring CERCLA
2 54
liability.
246. Id. Note that the LaFalce bill is similar to the final EPA rules in that it
requires actual participation in management, and permits loan work-out activities. Id.
247. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1988).
248. Lettow, supra note 13.

249. Liability Limits, supra note 241. The Garn proposal was passed by the
Senate, but was not included in the final bill because it was deemed too controversial. Senate-PassedLender Liability Title Would Amend CERCLA to Protect Bankers,
Banking Rep. (BNA), at 883 (Dec. 2, 1991).
250. Senate Votes 77-19 to Pass GSE Bill, Banking Daily (BNA) July 2, 1992).
The amendment was attached to S. 2733, which originally dealt with housingrelated government-sponsored enterprises. Id.

251. Id.
252. Liability Limits, supra note 241. Thus this bill is somewhat more narrow

than the LaFalce bill and the final EPA rules as far as the parties that are protected. Id. However, the bill would cover lenders under any federal law that
imposes strict liability for hazardous waste releases, as long as the lender did not

cause the contamination, whereas the EPA rules would only protect lenders
from CERCLA liability. Id.

253. Id.
254. Id. The Garn bill would also require the promulgation of federal regulations to ensure that lenders would perform pre-loan environmental audits. Id.
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The Lender's Role in Protecting Itself

The extent to which a lender may protect its security interest
without risking liability under CERCLA is still not completely certain. One way for a lender to avoid liability as an owner under
CERCLA would be to decline to foreclose on a property owned
by a borrower that has defaulted. 25 5 Alternatively, the lender
could foreclose on the property, but not purchase the property at
the foreclosure sale, and hope that there will be a willing buyer
who will pay a reasonable price. 2 56 Neither of these options is

financially attractive to lenders who desire at least an approxima257
tion of their expected return.
However, there are certain steps that a lender can take to
protect itself and which should also serve the public's interest in
preserving the environment. 2 58 A lender should engage in a careful evaluation of loan applicants, including conducting pre-approval audits of borrowers and their facilities, before agreeing to
take a security interest in the facility. 2 59 Lenders should also continue to conduct random or periodic environmental audits to remain aware of any current risk a facility may pose. 2 60 The loan
documentation itself can include warranties and representations
in which the borrower agrees to comply with certain conditions
established by the lender. 2 6 1 EPA has indicated that enforcement
of such conditions does not generally constitute evidence of man255. See Quentel, supra note 1, at 177.
256. Id.
257. See id. at 179.
258. Id. at 184-85.
259. Id. at 183. A comprehensive pre-loan evaluation may have the benefit
of informing borrowers for the first time that they have actual or potential environmental problems. John C. Buckley, Reducing the Environmental Impact of CERCLA, 41 S.C. L. REV. 765, 799 (1990). The borrower would then have the
knowledge and motivation to try to resolve these difficulties. Id. In addition, the
audit may indicate to the lender that the loan simply should not be made. Id.
260. Buckley, supra note 259, at 799. These continuing audits can prove
helpful in allowing lenders to assess their current risk, while providing a further
incentive for the borrower to comply with environmental requirements. Id.
261. Philip R. Sellinger & Avery S. Chapman, EPA's Proposed Rule on Lender
Liability Under CERCLA: No Panaceafor the Financial Services Industry, 21 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,618 (Oct. 1991). For example, a lender may reserve the
right to enter and inspect the facility to assess the extent of any environmental
damage, have the borrower warrant that it will comply with all environmental
regulations and statutes, and notify the lender immediately in the event of any
environmental problems. Id. In order to avoid the appearance that these "requirements" are evidence that the lender is managing the facility, it may be advisable to use negative covenants which forbid the borrower from taking certain
actions, rather than affirmative covenants that give the lender the right to directly affect operations of the facility. Id.
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agement participation. 26 2

A borrower presenting a high risk of environmental liability
may be required to purchase insurance against this risk, although
the high cost of such insurance may in effect make this requirement a denial of the loan. 2 63 Of the companies that offer limited

environmental insurance, most policies are limited in coverage
264
and subject to an initial independent risk assessment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The debate over the extent of the security interest exemption
under CERCLA continues. CERCLA itself does not contain a
clear legislative history to provide answers for those charged with
interpreting the exemption. 2 6 5 Court decisions have been inconsistent in dealing with several key issues concerning the exemption. 2 66 For example, there are conflicting opinions regarding the

types of indicia of ownership that qualify for the exemption. In
addition, there is much uncertainty as to the kinds of activities
that are deemed to be simply protecting a security interest versus
those that constitute participation in management. Environmental groups argue that the public welfare requires that lenders be
held accountable to the same extent as any other group. 26 7 Lenders, on the other hand, assert that future loans to entities representing even a slight risk of environmental liability will evaporate
2 68
without a broad exemption.
In light of the confusion and conflicting views, it is imperative that more definite guidance be provided regarding the security interest exemption. Whether the policy decision is made to
interpret the exemption narrowly or broadly, lenders and other
262. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,357. However, the exercise of a warrant or condition
must not cause a lender to become so directly involved with the operations of a
borrower that the lender would be considered to be participating in management as construed by the regulations and caselaw. Id.
263. Buckley, supra note 259, at 801. One reason environmental insurance
is difficult to obtain is because of the view held by insurance companies that it is
inevitable that waste sites will leak. Id. at 802.
264. Id. Environmental insurance policies often exclude long-term gradual
contamination, only providing coverage for "sudden and accidental" events. Id.
265. For a discussion of the legislative history of CERCLA, see supra notes
20-22 and accompanying text.
266. For a discussion of cases dealing with the security interest exemption,
see supra notes 53-161 and accompanying text.
267. For a discussion of the views of environmental groups on the proposed EPA regulations, see supra notes 217-25 and accompanying text.
268. For a discussion of lenders' views on the need for a strong security
interest exemption, see supra notes 226-39 and accompanying text.
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involved parties must be able to know the circumstances under
which liability will attach. Only with such knowledge can participants in the lending process recognize which actions are permissible under CERCLA and plan accordingly. Lenders will be
unlikely to execute any agreements involving potentially hazardous property if they are unable to predict the extent of their
liability.
The final rules promulgated by EPA, which call for a relatively expansive view of the exemption, are likely to best serve the
overall interests of all parties involved. A broad interpretation
seems more consistent with the logical intention of this provision
to limit liability of secured creditors. 269 Lenders will be more
comfortable in monitoring troubled enterprises closely without
fear of liability. This scenario is preferable to one in which lenders ignore real or potential problems because of a fear of liability.
Moreover, prospective borrowers will have increased access to
loan funds, and will have another interested party (the lender)
encouraging compliance with environmental requirements.
Lenders should not, of course, be completely absolved from
responsibility for cleanup costs. If a lender effectively takes control of a facility and its actions cause or greatly contribute to a
release of hazardous waste, the lender should face liability. Lenders not acting in good faith with respect to the environmental
problems of their debtors, by either ignoring the problems or exacerbating them, should similarly expect to pay for' the damage
caused.
Requiring pre-loan environmental audits and continuing
monitoring of facilities representing security interests seem to be
reasonable prerequisites to the security interest exemption.
These requirements do not appear overly burdensome, since it is
common for lenders to thoroughly investigate a prospective borrower before committing to a loan. If the inspection or monitoring is not done, the lender should bear the burden of proof to
show that such monitoring was not reasonably necessary or feasible. Holding lenders liable under any standard, however, only
seems reasonable when they are aware of the rules under which
269. See Bruce P. Howard & Melissa K. Gerard, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Sorting Out the Mixed Signals, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1187, 1220 (1991). The use
of a strict test in determining whether a lender has participated in management,
such as that espoused by the court in Fleet Factors, in effect creates another way to
find lenders liable, in addition to the owner or operator test. Id. at 1220-21.
This could lead to the anomalous result that the exemption would actually increase lender liability rather than restrict it. Id.
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they must operate. The final EPA regulations are a major step in
establishing such guidelines. A well-drafted legislative solution
would provide even more certainty, and therefore should be pursued.
BrianJ McGaughan
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